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Abstract
It has been well recognized that channel state information (CSI) feedback is of great importance for
dowlink transmissions of closed-loop wireless networks. However, the existing work typically researched
the CSI feedback problem for each individual mobile station (MS), and thus, cannot efficiently model the
interactions among self-interested mobile users in the network level. To this end, in this paper, we propose
an alternative approach to investigate the CSI feedback rate control problem in the analytical setting of a
game theoretic framework, in which a multiple-antenna base station (BS) communicates with a number
of co-channel MSs through linear precoder. Specifically, we first present a non-cooperative feedback-rate
control game (NFC), in which each MS selects the feedback rate to maximize its performance in a
distributed way. To improve efficiency from a social optimum point of view, we then introduce pricing,
called the non-cooperative feedback-rate control game with price (NFCP). The game utility is defined
as the performance gain by CSI feedback minus the price as a linear function of the CSI feedback
rate. The existence of the Nash equilibrium of such games is investigated, and two types of feedback
protocols (FDMA and CSMA) are studied. Simulation results show that by adjusting the pricing factor,
the distributed NFCP game results in close optimal performance compared with that of the centralized
scheme.
This paper is partially supported by US NSF CNS-0910461, CNS-0905556, CNS-0953377, and ECCS-1028782.
1I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing demands for fast and reliable wireless communications have spurred development of
multiple-antenna systems in order to efficiently harvest the capacity gains [1], [2]. Recent information-
theoretic research indicates that a feedback channel can be further employed to furnish channel state
information (CSI) to the transmitter side, which may affect closed-loop capacity gains [3]. With some
form of knowledge of the wireless channel conditions, the transmitter can adapt to the propagation
conditions by the use of a variety of channel adaptive techniques [4]. Specifically, in a multiple mobile
station (MS) scenario, with the knowledge of the channel to nearby co-channel MSs, it is possible to
actively suppress the signal to the interfered users and meanwhile maximize the effective signal power [5].
In this case, the base station (BS) can obtain the required channel coefficients through a feedback channel
from the MS. Then, mechanisms such as multiple-antenna precoding can be utilized to mitigate the effects
of co-channel interference and exploit spatial dimensions to increase the capacity of wireless networks [6].
Since CSI is essential for closed-loop wireless communication systems, the techniques on how to
effectively feedback CSI from the transmitter to the receiver has been intensively studied [3], [4]. As
perfect feedback of CSI is typically unavailable due to complexity or practicality constraints, the infinite
feedback of CSI is hard to realize in practice. Therefore, it is important to investigate how to control
the amount of feedback signalling overhead according to the individual requirements in order to achieve
good quality of service (QoS). As a result, CSI feedback rate control problem has attracted lots of
attention in recent years [5], [7]. In [8], the quantized feedback approach for power-control is designed
to minimize an upper bound of multiple-input-single-output (MISO) systems. Recently, two specific forms
of partial feedback, namely, channel mean feedback [9] and channel covariance feedback [10], have been
investigated for slow-varying and rapidly varying MIMO channels, respectively.
The existing work typically treated each MS independently, and researched the multi-MS CSI feedback
problem in physical layer, e.g., from either communication or information theory point of view. This
cannot efficiently model the interactions among self-interested mobile users in wireless systems [3], [5].
2If the feedback channel is limited, there exists conflicts in effective CSI feedback rates between each MS.
If one MS transmits too much CSI, it will result in the reduction of the rest MSs’ CSI feedback amounts,
and thus, degrade the others’ performance. Hence, it will be desirable to sort out the competition problem
by finding a balance in this multi-MS feedback scenario, and meanwhile achieve better QoS.
Game theory [11], [12] offers a set of mathematical tools to study the complex interactions among
interdependent rational players and predict their choices of strategies [13]–[15]. In this paper, an alternative
approach to the feedback rate control problem in wireless systems based on an economic model is
proposed. In this model, each MS’s preference is represented by a utility function, which quantifies the
level of satisfaction a user gets from using the system resources [16]. Each player in the game maximizes
a utility function in a distributed fashion. The game settles at a Nash equilibrium if one exists. Since
users act selfishly, the equilibrium point is not necessarily the best operating point from a social point of
view [17]. To achieve a more socially desirable result, a powerful tool by pricing the system resources
can be introduced, which is able to guide user behavior toward a more efficient operating point [16],
[17].
To the best of our knowledge, the game-theoretic methods are first applied to study CSI feedback rate
control under this economical model. Specifically, we investigate the scenario in a single-cell wireless
data network, where a multiple-antenna BS communicates with a number of co-channel users through a
minimum mean square error (MMSE) precoder and each user tries to maximize its own utility. Two types
of feedback protocols, FDMA and CSMA, are investigated. For ease of understanding, we first present
a noncooperative feedback rate control game (NFC), which optimizes individual utility in a distributed
fashion. While the resulting noncooperative feedback rate control game has a Nash equilibrium, it is
inefficient from a social point of view. Therefore, we further introduce pricing to create cooperation
between each MS in order to improve efficiency, called the noncooperative feedback-rate control game
with price (NFCP). The price function is a linear function of the CSI feedback rate that also allows a
distributed implementation by broadcasting the price per bandwidth from the BS to all the MSs. It shows
3that there exists an equilibrium in the proposed NFCP. Simulation results indicate that by adjusting price,
NFCP provides better overall utility than NFC. In addition, the distributed NFCP game approach achieves
near optimal performance compared to the centralized scheme, and thus, improves the overall throughput
of wireless data networks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we introduce some preliminaries, including
the system model, the multiple access protocols, and CSI feedback rate model. In Section III, we describe
the MMSE precoder, and some properties by using the CSI feedback rate model. The proposed NFC and
NFCP algorithms are described in IV. Simulation results are provided in Section V. In Section VI, we
draw the main conclusions. Some derivations are given in the appendixes.
Notation: Boldface lower-case letters denote vectors, (·)∗, (·)T and (·)H represent conjugate, transpose,
and conjugate transpose, respectively, ‖x‖2 = xHx, and Var[x] represents its variance.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first give the system model. Then two types of feedback channels are discussed.
Finally, the CSI feedback rate model is illustrated.
A. System Model
In this paper, we consider a system in which a number of co-channel MSs are served by one BS. The
architecture is depicted in Fig.1. The BS is assumed to know the linear processing performed by the MSs,
which can acquire the required CSI through a feedback channel from the MSs. Using multiple antennas
at the BS of a cellular system, transmit precoding can be performed for simultaneous transmission to
several co-channel mobile users. The precoder is designed assuming a stationary scenario in which the
fast (Rayleigh) fading is described by its second order properties. We also assume narrow-band signals
without any time dispersion, i.e., the channel fading is frequency flat. For simplicity, we assume every
MS is equipped with a single receive antenna. We assume that the system works in a FDD model, where
the BS has Nt transmit antennas serving Ns MSs simultaneously in the same frequency band, while each
4MS feeds back the CSI through different channels in order to better protect the control information by
avoiding collisions.
For the k-th MS, the input signal, xk, is first precoded by complex weights wk ∈ CNt×1 before
transmitted from the Nt antennas at the BS. The corresponding output can be written as
sk = wkxk, (1)
where sk ∈ CNt×1.
The received signal at the k-th MS can be then expressed as
yk = h
T
k
Ns∑
i=1
si + nk
= hTk
Ns∑
i=1
wHi xi + nk
= hTkwkxi + h
T
k
Ns∑
i=1,i 6=k
wixi + nk, (2)
where hk = [h1,k, . . . , hNt,k]T ∈ CNt×1 represents the channel coefficients from the BS to the k-th MS
with zero mean and unit variance, nk is the AWGN noise CN (0, N0), hTkwkxk is the desired signal,
and hTk
∑Ns
i=1,i 6=k wixi can be treated as the interference. Note that the model can easily be extended
to frequency selective channels, taking both co-channel interference and inter-symbol interference into
account [6].
B. Two Multiple Access Models
In this subsection, two multiple access protocols for the uplink are presented. For simplicity, in the
downlink, the BS simultaneously serves multiple co-channel mobile users by performing precoding, while
in the uplink two standard multiple access protocols are examined for CSI feedback. We assume that the
total system bandwidth is B, and the bandwidths for downlink and uplink transmissions are BDL and
BUL, respectively. Then, we have
B = BDL +BUL. (3)
51) Frequency Division Multiple Access: The BS serves MSs simultaneously in the same frequency
band, while each MS feeds back the CSI through orthogonal channels, i.e., frequency division multiple
access (FDMA), in order to better protect the control information by avoiding interference.
Recalling (11), the uplink bandwidth can be then calculated as
BUL = β
Ns∑
k=1
rk, (4)
where β denotes a scaling factor to transform the uplink CSI feedback rate into bandwidth. And the
downlink bandwidth can be expressed as
BDL = B −BUL = B − β
Ns∑
k=1
rk. (5)
2) Carrier Sense Multiple Access: Likewise, the BS serves MSs simultaneously in the same frequency
band, while each MS feeds back the CSI through Carrier Sense Multiple Access (CSMA), which can
listen to channel before transmitting a packet to avoid the avoidable collisions. Sender retransmits after
some random time if there is a collision. For efficiency, slotted CSMA is considered: Time is slotted and
a packet can only be transmitted at the beginning of one slot. Sender finds out whether transmission was
successful or experienced a collision by listening to the ACK/NACK broadcast from the receiver.
Without loss of generality, we consider the slotted p-persistent CSMA in [18], which can be described
by the following steps:
• If the channel is idle, transmit with probability p, and delay for worst case propagation delay for
one packet with probability 1− p;
• If the channel is busy, continue to listen until medium becomes idle, then go to Step 1;
• If transmission is delayed by one time slot, continue with Step 1.
For slotted p-persistent CSMA, the throughput (S) is given by [18]:
S =
G
∑∞
k=0(p(1 − p)k + α[1 − (1− p)k+1]) · exp
(
G(1− p)k+1 + αG[−(k + 1) + 1−(1−p)k+2
p
]
)
(1 + α) · exp(G(1 + α)) + α∑∞k=1 · exp (G(1 − p)k + αG[−k + 1−(1−p)k+1p ])
, (6)
where α = τ
T
, τ is the propagation delay, T is the packet transmission time, and G is the offered
load (overall rate). By CSMA, each user tries to adjust its requested feedback rate rk over the uplink
6bandwidth BDL. However, if the overall rate is too high, due to the random access nature, the network
would be congested. As a result, the accurate rate zk of user k will reduce a lot. From [19], we have
zk(rk, r−k) =


rkS
G
, if G ≤ G0,
0, otherwise,
(7)
where the overall rate G =
∑
k rk, and G0 is the maximum network payload. Similarly, the downlink
bandwidth can be calculated as that in (5): BDL = B − β
∑Ns
k=1 rk.
C. CSI Feedback Rate Model
In a closed-loop wireless communication system, the MS needs to feed back the quantized CSI back
to the BS to perform transmit precoding. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we here use the
equivalent quantized feedback channel by transforming the real channel matrix in terms of feedback rate
and distortion. We consider a limited and lossless feedback channel. Through CSI quantization, the real
channel output for the k-th MS, denoted by hk, can be modeled as [20]
hk = hk + ns, (8)
where hk ∈ CNt×1 represents the quantized feedback channel output with zero mean and 1−Dk variance,
ns ∈ CNt×1 is an independent additive noise matrix with each entry corresponding to an i.i.d. Gaussian
variable with distribution CN (0,Dk), and Dk represents the channel quantization distortion constraint.
Note that hk and ns are mutually independent. Due to imperfection in the feedback channel, the quality
of the feedback information can be measured by the distortion on the source hk from its representation
hk, which is defined by
Dk = ‖hk − hk‖2. (9)
Lemma 1: Given distortion rate Dk, the quantized CSI can be modeled as
hk = µhk + νnq, (10)
where µ = 1−Dk, the elements of nq ∈ CNt×1 are i.i.d. Gaussian variables with distribution CN (0, 1),
and ν =
√
Dk(1−Dk). The detailed derivations of µ and ν is given in Appendix A.
7Based on the Shannon’s rate-distortion theory of continuous-amplitude sources, the rate-distortion
function of a zero-mean and unit variance complex Gaussian source is given by [22]
rk = log2
(
1
Dk
)
, (11)
where rk represents the feedback rate of user k. It can be observed in (11) that when Dk = 1, i.e.,
completely distorted, the feedback rate is equal to zero, while Dk → 0, this requires the infinite feedback
rate to realize the undistorted CSI.
Substituting (11) into (10), the quantized CSI matrix, hk, can be expressed as a function of the feedback
rate, rk
hk = (1− 2−rk)hk +
√
2−rk(1− 2−rk)nq, (12)
which clearly connects the feedback rate, rk, with the quantized CSI, h, in order to reveal its impact on
system performance. After normalization, (12) becomes
hk =
√
1− 2−rkhk +
√
2−rknq, (13)
which can be used to perform precoding at the BS side.
III. TRANSMIT PRECODING WITH LIMITED CSI FEEDBACK
In this section, we first present transmit precoder implemented at BS, and then discuss a few properties
of limited CSI feedback.
A. Minimum Mean Square Error Precoder
For simplicity and without loss of generality, we just consider the conventional MMSE based precoder
design, and other advanced precoding approaches can be readily applied in this paper. The received
signals in (2) can be rewritten in a matrix form
y = HWx+ n, (14)
where y = [y1, . . . , yNs ]T ∈ CNs×1, H = [h1, . . . ,hNs ]T ∈ CNs×Nt , W = [w1, . . . ,wNt ] ∈ CNt×Nt ,
and n = [n1, . . . , nNs ]T ∈ CNs×1.
8In this section, we demonstrate that the following form for the precoder
W = KH
H
(H H
H
+ ψI)−1, (15)
with two free scalar parameters K and ψ, is a general form for an optimal linear precoder, and H =
[h1, . . . ,hNs ]
T ∈ CNs×Nt . By varying the choice of these parameters, optimality can be achieved with
respect to a variety of criteria that have been considered in the literature. In general, K is a normalization
constant used to comply with the unit transmit power constraint (averaged over data symbols), and it can
be expressed as
K =‖ T ‖−1, (16)
where T = HH(H HH + ψI)−1 represents the unnormalized transmit precoder. The other parameter,
ψ, is typically a regularization parameter. Maximizing the average SINR under flat fading, which is the
same for all MSs due to the assumption of symmetry in the distribution of the channel matrix, and taking
Nt and Ns (which in this context, is the number of transmit antennas as well as the number of MSs with
single antenna) large, the optimal ψ can be expressed as the following general form [21]
ψ ≈ SINR−1. (17)
Note that although ψ was solved for the equal SINR case in [21], ψ is really a tunable parameter that
can be optimized for other criteria. By setting ψ = 0, (15) becomes the simplest and the most common
zero-forcing (channel inversion) precoder
W = KH
H
(H H
H
)−1. (18)
Recalling (2), the signal to noise plus interference ratio (SINR) of the k-th MS can be written as
γk =
| hTkwk |2
| hTk
∑Ns
i=1,i 6=k wi |2 +N0
. (19)
Its corresponding throughput can be expressed as
Ck(γk) = BDL log2(1 + γk). (20)
9B. Analysis of the CSI feedback impact
Since the precoder W is designed by the feedback CSI, H, optimal performance using the MMSE rule
can be achieved when rk → +∞, for ∀i ∈ [1, . . . , Ns]. We in this subsection present a few properties of
(19) based on the CSI feedback:
1) γk is continuous and monotonic increasing in rk.
Proof: It is obvious in (19) that γk is continuous in rk. In addition, from (12), we can see
that the increase of rk, i.e. the decrease of Dk, improves the amount of the feedback CSI, hk. This
enhances the accuracy of the constructed precoder, wk, and thus, increases the value of SINRk.
2) lim
rk→+∞
γk = εk, where εk is a constant.
Proof: Given ri (for ∀i ∈ [1, . . . , Ns], but i 6= k), we have lim
rk→+∞
hk = hk. Hence, γk
converges to a constant when the feedback rate is large enough.
In 1), it implies that the feedback rate (rk) of every MS should be as large as possible. However, if using
orthogonal channels in Subsection-II-C-1), this will reduce the downlink bandwidth and then decrease
the system throughput. By adopting the CSMA protocol in Subsection-II-C-2), this will results in more
collisions in the uplink, and degrade the effective feedback rate. Obviously, there exists a trade-off between
feedback rate (rk) and system throughput (Ck(γk)) in both uplink multiple access protocols. Notice that
these properties will be reused to prove the existence of the NFCP equilibrium in Subsection-IV-B.
IV. NONCOOPERATIVE FEEDBACK CONTROL GAME FOR CHANNEL STATE INFORMATION
In this section, we first define the utility function. Then, we describe the noncooperative CSI feedback
control game. Next, we use the pricing method to improve the performance of the proposed game. the
convergence to the Nash equilibrium is also proved. Finally, we construct a centralized solution for
performance comparison.
A. Utility Function
The concept of utility is commonly used in microeconomics and refers to the level of satisfaction the
decision-taker receives as a result of its actions. MSs access a wireless system through the air interface
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that is a common resource and they transmit information expending bandwidth resources. Since the air
interface is a shared medium, each MS’ transmission is a source of competition for others. SINR is an
effective measure of the quality of signal reception for the wireless user [22]. An MS tries to achieve a
high quality of reception (throughput in this paper) while at the same time expending a certain amount
of system bandwidth to feedback CSI. Obviously, the CSI feedback rate determines the accuracy of the
precoder, and thus, affect the system throughput. Therefore, it is possible to view both throughput and
the CSI feedback rate as commodities that a wireless user desires. The utility function of the k-th MS
can be expressed as
uk = Ck(γk) = BDL log2(1 + γk). (21)
Utility as defined above is the throughput conditioned on the feedback bit. Note that if rk = 0,
omnidirectional transmission instead of precoding should be used which results in minimum value of Ck.
This suggests that, in order to maximize utility, all users in the system should feed back a certain amount
of CSI. For orthogonal feedback channels in (5), when the amount of feedback increases, downlink
bandwidth, BDL, will decrease, and thus reduce the system throughput. With regard to CSMA, when the
network payload increases, more collisions happen and consequently the average delay for each packet
increases. Any network payload larger than G0 in (7) will cause an unacceptable average delay. As a
result, the utility becomes zero. All these facts indicate that the feedback rate should not be either too
small or too large for better utility. In other word, there is an optimal point on how much to feedback
from each MS point of view.
Intuitively, there exists a tradeoff relationship between obtaining high throughput and requiring small
amount of CSI feedback on the condition of a total system bandwidth constraint. Finding a good balance
between the two conflicting objectives is the primary focus of the CSI feedback rate control component
of radio resource management. This tradeoff is illustrated through the conceptual plot in Fig. 2, where
orthogonal feedback channel is assumed. If the feedback rate were fixed, the terminal would experience
higher throughput as the SINR increases which leads to increased satisfaction of the use of the system
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resources. If the SINR were to be fixed (fixed throughput), increasing the feedback rate expedites uplink
bandwidth, which effectively reduces the satisfaction of the mobile terminal. For sufficiently large SINR
values, the throughput approaches zero, which results in an asymptotic decrease in utility in the high
SINR region.
B. Game Formulation
In the sequel, we first consider the noncooperative feedback rate control game (NFC) where each
MS tries to maximize its individual utility. Let G = [N, {Rk}, {uk(·)}] denote the NFC where N =
{1, . . . , Ns} is the index set for the mobile users currently in the cell, Rk is the strategy set, and uk(·)
is the payoff function of user k. Each user selects a feedback rate level rk such that rk ∈ Rk. Let the
feedback rate vector r = (r1, . . . , rNs) ∈ R denote the user’s strategies in terms of the selected rate
levels of all the users, where R is the set of all rate vectors. The resulting utility level for the k-th user
is uk(rk, r−k), where r−k denotes the vector consisting of the other user’s strategies other than the k-th
user. This notation emphasizes that the k-th user has control over its own rate, rk only. The utility of the
k-th MS with feedback rate rk can be expressed more rigorously as
uk(rk, r−k) = BDL log2(1 + γk(rk, r−k)). (22)
Note that (22) demonstrates the strategic interdependence between MSs. The level of utility each MS
gets depends on its own feedback rate and also on the choice of other players’ strategies, through the
SINR γk of that user. The efficiency function can be chosen to represent any precoding scheme described
in Section III. In this paper, we assume that the strategy space, Rk, of each user is a compact, convex
set with minimum and maximum rate constraints denoted by rmink and rmaxk , respectively. For simplicity,
we let rmink = 0 for all k, which results in the strategy space Rk = [0, rmaxk ]. The utility function takes
the generic form given in Fig. 3 for fixed interference plus noise.
The NFC game can be expressed as
(NFC) max
rk∈Rk
uk(rk, r−k), ∀k ∈ N . (23)
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From (23), it clearly indicates that the feedback rate that optimizes individual utility depends on rates
of all the other MSs in the network. It is necessary to characterize a set of rates where the users are
satisfied with the utility they receive given the rate selections of other users.
NFC offers a solution to the rate control problem where no MS can increase its utility any further
through individual effort. Thus, it is an outcome obtained as a result of distributed decision taking,
which could be expected to be less efficient than a possible rate selection obtained through cooperation
between terminals and/or as a result of centralized optimization. Specifically, in the NFC, each MS aims
to maximize its own utility by adjusting its own feedback rate, but it ignores the cost (or harm) it imposes
on the other terminals. For example, by orthogonal feedback channels, if one MS increases the usage of
bandwidth in order to send more CSI, it will decrease the available bandwidth for other MSs. While for
CSMA, the higher feedback rate will cause the heavier collision possibility.
C. Pricing Mechanism
To overcome this problem, we resort to a usage-based pricing schemes. By introducing a pricing factor
for the feedback CSI, we can increase system performance by implicitly inducing cooperation, and yet
we maintain the noncooperative nature of the resulting feedback rate of the CSI control solution. Within
the context of a resource allocation problem for a closed-loop wireless system, the resource being shared
is the radio environment, and the resource usage is determined by MS’s feedback rate. Hence, efficiency
in feedback rate control can be promoted by the proposed usage-based pricing strategy where each user
pays a penalty proportional to its usage amount, i.e. rate, of feedback CSI.
The NFCP can be expressed as the following optimization problem
(NFCP) max
rk∈Rk
uck(rk, r−k) = uk(rk)− ck(rk), ∀k ∈ N (24)
where Gc = [N, {Rk}, {uck(·)}] represents a Ns player noncooperative feedback rate control game with
pricing (NFCP), uck(rk, r−k) is the utility for NFCP, and ck(rk) denotes the pricing function for the k-th
MS, which in this paper is restricted to linear schemes of the form
ck(rk) = αrk. (25)
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TABLE I
NFCP ALGORITHM FOR EACH MS
Algorithm 1: Non-cooperative CSI feedback rate control game with a
given price α at the MS side
1. Set initial CSI vector at time t = 0: r(0) = r0. Also, let k = 1;
2. For all j, such that τj ∈ T :
∗ Given r−k(τj−1), compute:
rk(τj) = argmaxrk∈rk u
c
k(rk, r−k(τj−1).
Here α is announced by the BS and is a constant referred to as the price factor per feedback bandwidth.
Note that (24) also demonstrates the strategic interdependence between users, and the pricing factor
needs to be tuned such that user self-interest leads to the best possible improvement in overall network
performance. Combining (21) and (25), the NFCP with linear price in (24) is as follows
(NFCP) max
rk∈Rk
uck(rk) = BDL log2(1 + γk)− αrk, ∀k ∈ N . (26)
By considering the NFCP algorithm in (26), given α, a sequence of rates can be generated in Table I.
We refer to rk(τj) as the set of best feedback rates for the k-th MS at time j instance in response to
the interference vector r−k(τj−1). For the network level algorithm for each value of α, we may first
run the NFCP when α = 0, which is equivalent to the NFC described in (23). Once the equilibrium
with no price is obtained, the NFCP is played again after incrementing the price factor, α, by a positive
value, △α. Algorithm I returns a set of CSI rates at equilibrium with this value of the price factor. If the
utilities at this new equilibrium with some positive price improve with respect to the previous instance,
the price factor is incremented and the procedure is repeated. We continue until an increase in results in
utility levels worse than the previous equilibrium values for at least one user. We declare the last value
to be the best price factor, αBEST. The way that αBEST is determined by the network is summarized in
algorithmic format in Table II.
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TABLE II
NFCP ALGORITHM FOR THE NETWORK
Algorithm 2: Non-cooperative CSI feedback rate control game with price
algorithm for the whole network
1. Set α = 0 and announce α = 0 to all MSs;
2. Get uk for all at equilibrium using Algorithm 1, increase α := α+
△α, and then announce to all MSs;
2. If uαk < uα+δαk for all then go to step 2, else stop and declare αBEST = α.
D. Nash Equilibrium
In this subsection, we investigate the equilibrium of the proposed games, at which no player can
improve its utility by changing its own strategy only. Note that since NFC can be treated as a special
case of NFCP when α = 0, it would be sufficient to declare the equilibrium existence of the NFC if a
Nash equilibrium exists in the NFCP.
Definition 1: A rate vector r = (r1, . . . , rNs) is a Nash equilibrium of the NPCP G = [N, {Rk}, {uck(·)}]
if, for every k ∈ N , uck(rk, r−k) ≥ uck(r′k, r−k), r′k ∈ Rk.
There are some existing theorems to show the existence. We only need to prove that the proposed
game satisfies the requirements of the theorems. It has been shown a Nash equilibrium exists, for ∀ k:
Theorem 1: A Nash equilibrium exists in the NFCP, G = [N, {rk}, uck(·)] if ∀k ∈ N :
1) rk, the support domain of uk(rk), is a nonempty, convex, and compact subset of a certain Euclidean
space R.
2) uk(rk) is continuous in r and quasi-concave in rk.
Proof: Obviously, the support domain rk, which is a vector, satisfies the first condition.
To prove that uck(rk) is quasi-concave, it is equivalent to prove that the first-order derivative of uck(rk)
is a monotonic decreasing function whose value varies from positive to negative in term of rk [24]. For
convenience, let bk(rk) , B − β
∑Ns
k=1 rk and wk(rk) , log2(1+γk), and thus uck(rk) = bk(rk)wk(rk)−
αrk. The first-order derivative of uck(rk) with respect to rk can be calculated as
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uck
′(rk) = b
′
k(rk)wk(rk) + bk(rk)w
′
k(rk)− α, (27)
where b′k(rk) = −β.
As γk is continuous and monotonic increasing in rk, proved in Subsection-III-C-1, it is obvious that
wk(rk) is also continuous and monotonic increasing in rk, i.e. w′k(rk) > 0. In addition, since wk(rk)
is concave in term of rk, wk ′′(rk) ≤ 0, which indicates that w′k(rk) is a decreasing function. Because
bk(rk) is monotonic decreasing in rk, we may conclude that both b′k(rk)wk(rk) and bk(rk)w′k(rk) are
decreasing functions. Hence, uck ′(rk) is monotonic decreasing in rk.
As lim
rk→+∞
γk = εk, we may easily obtain lim
rk→+∞
w′k(rk) = 0. From (27), given the pricing factor α,
we can then have:
• lim
rk→0
uck
′(rk) = Bw
′
k(rk)− α > 0;
• lim
rk→+∞
uck
′(rk) = −βwk(rk)− α < 0.
Hence, uck(rk) is a concave function, and as every concave function is quasiconcave, Theorem 1 is
proved. Finally, we prove the existence of the equilibrium of the game, and can conclude that game G
of (26) always admits at least one Nash equilibrium.
E. Centralized Scheme
To compare the performance, a centralized scheme is constructed assuming all CSI is known. The
objective is to optimize the sum rate capacity defined in (21) subject to the constraint of feedback rates:
max
ri
Ns∑
i=1
ui(ri)
s.t. B − β
Ns∑
i=1
ri > 0,
0 ≤ ri ≤ rmax. (28)
Notice that our proposed noncooperative game theoretic based algorithm is distributive, in the sense that
only the price information needs to be exchanged, while the centralized scheme needs to gather all the
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information, which will cause significant signalling.
F. Implementation Discussion
There are several implementation issues for the proposed scheme. Firstly, the channel estimation for the
downlink channel might not be accurate due to both fast fading and noise effects. Under this condition,
the transmit precoder formula should be rewritten considering the estimation inaccuracy. Secondly, the
proposed scheme needs iteratively update the price and rate information. A natural question arises if
the distributed scheme has less signalling than the centralized scheme. The comparison is similar to
distributed and centralized power control in the literature [25], [26]. Since the channel condition is
continuously changing, the distributed solution only needs to update the difference of the parameters
such as rate and pricing factor, while the centralized scheme requires all channel information in each
time period. As a result, the distributed solution has a clear advantage and dominates the current and
future wireless network design. For example, the power control for cellular networks, the open loop power
control is done only once during the link initialization, while the close-loop power control (distributed
power allocation such as [25]) is performed 1500 times for UMTS and 800 times for CDMA2000. Finally,
for the multi-BS multi-MS case, we can use clustering method to divide the network into sub-networks,
and then employ the single BS-MSs solution proposed in this paper.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide simulation results for the proposed distributed games. All simulations are
performed for a BPSK modulation over the Rayleigh fading channels with the MMSE precoder in (15).
For simplicity, we assume that both the transmit power and the noise variance are normalized to unit.
The specific parameters are given below each figure.
A. Results through Orthogonal Feedback Channels
In this subsection, we first provide simulations to evaluate the impact of CSI feedback on each
individual. Here we plot the utility of MS1 in term of its CSI feedback rate by fixing the feedback
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rates of the rest MSs. For simplicity, we assume 2 MSs and the CSI feedback rate of MS2 is r2 = 1, 3,
and 10, respectively. From Fig. 3, we can see that when the feedback rates of other users are fixed
(fixed uplink bandwidth), the target MS will first experience high throughput as its CSI feedback rate
increases, which then leads to increased satisfaction of the use of the system resources. For sufficiently
large r1 values, the utility of MS1 begins to decrease. It is obvious that the utility function of each MS
is a concave function in terms of the feedback rate, which again partially proves through simulations the
existence of equilibrium of the proposed NFCP game.
Fig. 4 is constructed by letting the algorithm in Table I reach the Nash equilibrium at each value of
α. The best price factor can be found if all mobile users receive worse overall payoff than the previous
equilibrium utility according to algorithm II. It can be also observed from the figure when the pricing
factor increases, the total utility and the sum rates first increase, as shown in the small window, and
then begin to decrease. It indicates that solution by NFCP with α = αBEST = 0.025 offers a significant
improvement in total utilities with respect to the NFC when α = 0, where pricing factor is not involved.
At high pricing factor, we can see both sum utility and rate converge to a constant value. This is because
the system stops requiring users feedback CSI as it costs too much.
In Fig. 5, we compare the proposed NFCP game theoretical approach with the centralized scheme.
From the simulation results, we can see that the distributed solution and the centralized solution are
asymptotically the same if α is in the right region. When α is too large, the MSs will be reluctant to
feedback. When α is too small, the MSs will feed back in a non-cooperative manner. In Fig. 6, it shows
that the variations of the sum feedback rate as well as the individual feedback rate in term of the pricing
factor, where BUL = β
∑Ns
k=1 rk. From the figure we can see that these results match very well the
sum rate result in Fig. 4. When α = 0, it requires the maximum amount of feedback. But with the price
increase, the feedback rate starts to decrease until zero, which make the throughput dropped to minimum.
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B. Results through CSMA
For simplicity, we here consider a special case of slotted p-persistent CSMA by setting p = 1, i.e.,
1-persistent CSMA. In Fig. 7, it shows the total throughput again the traffic load. It indicates that there
exists an optimal transmission rate corresponding to the maximum throughput. In Fig. 8, we examine the
impact of CSI feedback on each individual using CSMA. From Fig. 8, we can see that the utility function
of each MS is a concave function in terms of the feedback rate, which again proves the effectiveness
of the proposed NFCP game. In Fig. 9, we evaluate the throughput performance in term of the pricing
factor. It shows in Fig. 9 that the proposed NFCP provides much better results than the NFC game.
Fig. 10 compares the proposed NFCP game with the centralized scheme. From the simulation results, we
can see that the distributed solution and the centralized solution are almost the same when α is adjusted
to the optimal working point.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the CSI feedback rate control problem in a single-cell wireless data
network, where a multiple-antenna BS communicates with a number of co-channel users through a
MMSE precoder. Specifically, we proposed a non-cooperative feedback-rate control game without and
with price. The price function is a linear function of the CSI feedback rate. The existence of the Nash
equilibrium of such a game is proved. Simulation results are performed over FDMA and CSMA protocols
in the feedback channel. It shows that the distributed NFCP game with the proposed utility results in
improving the overall throughput of wireless data networks, and the simple distributed algorithm can
provide comparative performance in comparison of the centralized one by properly varying the pricing
parameter.
APPENDIX A
PARAMETER DERIVATIONS IN (10)
Thought channel quantization, µ can be simply expressed by the following linear function
µ = x+ yDk. (29)
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The real channel output hk and its corresponding quantized channel hk in (10) satisfies the following
linear extreme conditions:
• When there is no quantization errors, i.e., ν = Dk = 0, we have
µ2 = x2 = 1; (30)
• When the quantization is completely inaccurate, i.e., Dk = 1 and µ = 0, we get
µ2 = (x+ y)2 = 0. (31)
Combining (30) and (31), we may easily get µ = 1−Dk. Recalling (8), from (10), we can also have
Var
[
hk
]
= Var [µhk + νnq] = Var [µhk] + Var [νnq]⇒ 1−Dk = µ2 + ν2, (32)
and thus, we can finally obtain ν =
√
Dk(1−Dk).
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Fig. 1. System model: One BS is serving a number of MSs by precoding based on the CSI feedback.
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Fig. 2. The behavior of the MS’ utility as a function of SINR for fixed feedback rate, and as a function of feedback rate for
fixed SINR.
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Fig. 3. The utility of MS1 in term of r1, where the number of MSs is 2 and r2 = 1, 3, 10 over orthogonal feedback channels.
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Fig. 4. Performance of NFCP over orthogonal feedback channels, where the number of MSs is 10, B = 20, and β = 0.01.
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Fig. 5. Performance comparisons of NFCP and the centralized scheme over orthogonal feedback channels, where the number
of MSs is 10, B = 20, and β = 0.01.
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Fig. 6. Uplink bandwidth occupancy in terms of the pricing factor over orthogonal feedback channels, where the number of
MSs is 10, B = 20, and β = 0.01.
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Fig. 7. Throughput of slotted 1-persistent CSMA.
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Fig. 8. The utility of MS1 in term of r1 over CSMA feedback channels, where the number of MSs is 2 and r2 = 1, 3, 10.
25
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
100
200
300
α, pricing facor
Th
ro
ug
hp
ut
 (b
ps
/H
z)
 
 
NFCP: Sum utility
NFCP: Sum rate
NFC: Sum utility
Fig. 9. Performance of NFCP over CSMA feedback channels, where the number of MSs is 10, and B = 20.
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Fig. 10. Performance of NFCP and the centralized scheme over CSMA feedback channels, where the number of MSs is 10,
and B = 20.
